En el presente ensayo se buscará exponer, a través de una problematización histórica, la radical novedad filosófica que representa la teoría freudiana de la constitución de la autoconsciencia moral a partir de la introyección de la ley paterna. Para esto, se mostrarán, en primer lugar, los hitos históricamente relevantes que permitieron instalar una reflexión sobre la interioridad moral en la filosofía agustiniana, contraponiéndola con el pensamiento helénico clásico. Posteriormente, se expondrá la hipótesis nietzscheana sobre la aparición de la moralidad como (...) una estrategia de poder dentro de la tradición judeo-cristiana para, por un lado, mostrar sus insuficiencias y, por el otro, dar paso a la teoría freudiana de la formación de la consciencia moral como un proceso identificatorio con respecto a la figura del padre, lo que permite explicar el fenómeno de la autocrítica moral como un tipo particular de autodistanciamiento con respecto a sí. (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of genetic phenomenology while trying to demonstrate that its elaboration leads Husserl to dismiss de facto the main motivation of his idealism—namely the idea that at the basis of constitution is an immanent and formless stuff shaped or animated by subjective acts. Indeed genetic analysis shows that the original stuff of constitution consists of sensuous contents structured according to a material lawfulness grounded on their peculiarity. By affecting the subject, such contents motivate (...) the performing of intentional acts and are the genuine motor of constitution. The genetic ground of apperceptions is thus material content. (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it is grounded on (...) sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se expondrá la relación que existe entre los mecanismos de constitución subjetiva en la concepción de ideología de Althusser y la teoría lacaniana del estadio del espejo y su función en la formación del yo. Concretamente, se resaltará la operación de representación unitaria del yo en el plano imaginario y su traslado a la función de la ideología relativa a la constitución de individuos en sujetos. Para esto, se realizará un recorrido introductorio de la argumentación que (...) Althusser exhibe en _Ideología y aparatos ideológicos del Estado_ hasta llegar al punto nodal del tratamiento de la ideología y su rol en la reproducción de las condiciones de producción, esto, a través de su función de producción de subjetividades autoidentificadas. En este punto, se introducirá, junto con otras reflexiones asociadas, el texto de Lacan _El estadio del espejo como formador de la función del yo [je] tal como se nos revela en la experiencia analítica_ para dar cuenta de la transformación que ejerce en el infante la incorporación de su imagen especular exterior en los procesos identificatorios. Con estos antecedentes, se argumentará que la teoría lacaniana de la función especular ejerce un rol de fundamentación sobre el análisis althusseriano de la ideología, debido a que aporta el pivote conceptual que permite pensar la principal operación de la ideología: la constitución de sujetos. _Palabras clave:_ Ideología – Sujeto – Espejo – Lacan – Althusser. (shrink)

Um dos mal-entendidos mais persistentes que cercam a filosofia leibniziana consiste, sem dúvida, em querer ver nela uma forma de espinosismo. Por outro lado, toda oposição que se faz entre Leibniz e Espinosa no plano teórico aparentemente não ultrapassa a visão hegeliana da relação entre os dois filósofos como oposição entre universalidade e individualidade. Pretende-se aqui, diferentemente, confrontar os dois filósofos em relação à questão da individualidade confrontando os seus prolongamentos teóricos do século XX. De um lado, a intersubjetividade husserliana (...) como prolongamento teórico da monadologia; de outro, o conceito simondoniano de transindividualidade que, com Balibar, permite-nos prolongar o pensamento espinosano na contemporaneidade. Tentar-se-á marcar toda a distância que separa estes dois sistemas segundo uma abordagem que não se limita a repetir o velho refrão hegeliano. (shrink)

The paper analyses Husserl’s critique of Kant’s regressive transcendental method while trying to show that at the basis of it is an opposite conception of the conditions of possibility of experience: whereas for Kant experience is structured by the subject through intellectual forms, for Husserl it has a structure before the intervention of the subject. Therefore–contrary to Iso Kern’s opinion–the contrast between Kant and Husserl cannot be traced back to mere methodical divergences.

Der Aufsatz will nachweisen, dass Husserls Denken in der Tat eine Erledigung des Cartesianismus darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Husserls Denken eine ganz andere Auffassung der Wahrnehmung und der Evidenz als Descartes zugrunde liegt. Denn – im Vorgriff auf eine Einsicht, die gegenwärtig in der analytischen Philosophie vertreten wird – meint Husserl, eine Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz könne nur aufgrund anderer Wahrnehmungen oder Evidenzen bezweifelt werden. Deshalb setzt jede solche Bezweifelung das Vertrauen in die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz voraus und kann nicht (...) die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz als solche betreffen, sondern lediglich ihre einzelnen Fälle. Demzufolge ist die phänomenologische Reduktion nicht eine Art methodischer Zweifel, und das Husserlsche cogito hat nicht dieselbe Bedeutung wie das Cartesianische cogito. All das beruht auf einer Auffassung der Wirklichkeit, deren Kern in der Identifikation von Wirklichkeit und Erfahrbarkeit liegt, die aber keine Reduktion der Dinge auf das Bewusstsein impliziert. (shrink)

En este artículo, busco exponer la relación que tiene la situación de confinamiento en la que nos encontramos, Internet y las múltiples consecuencias que puede tener la producción masificada de datos en diversos ámbitos de nuestra experiencia social. Esto implica problematizar el estatus que tiene Internet en nuestra vida cotidiana, cómo su arquitectura permite articularlo como dispositivo de poder y vigilancia, en que medida opera cómo fuente ilimitada de información de diversa índole y las posibles consecuencias que tiene esta extracción (...) en dimensiones tanto políticas como económicas en nuestra sociedad contemporánea. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se expondrá la relevancia del rito en el trabajo del duelo, haciendo posible la transición de la muerte real a la simbólica. Para ello, se iniciará con una reflexión filosófica sobre la muerte, vinculándola con la definición lacaniana de “agujero en lo real”. Se buscará mostrar que, aunque el sujeto no puede evadir este fenómeno radical, aún puede actuar asumiéndolo. Posteriormente, se problematizará la distinción que establece Žižek entre la muerte simbólica y la real, ilustrada mediante (...) Hamlet y otras tragedias griegas clásicas. Luego, se analizará el concepto de “duelo” desde el psicoanálisis, abordando elementos de la reflexión freudiana y su conexión con la definición lacaniana de la muerte. Finalmente, se argumentará que el rito es esencial para la efectividad del duelo, permitiendo acoplar la muerte real a la simbólica y completando el fallecimiento en sus dos dimensiones. (shrink)

This paper analyses the question of animals in the framework of the phenomenological problem of the common world. First, it underlines the contrast between Husserl’s idea of animals as subjects acting in accordance with a motivation, and the views of Descartes, Heidegger and Sellars, who consider animal behaviour as mechanical or instinctive. After an account of the phenomenological approach to the question of the common world and of Husserl’s position concerning animals, it is showed that the results of scientific research (...) on animal behaviour mainly confirm that position. (shrink)

I develop a phenomenological critique to Husserl’s metaphysics, by showing that – contrary to what the majority of critical literature claims – metaphysical questions are alien to phenomenology. Husserl engages with the discussion of these topics only because of ideological-existential motives, and, when he deals with that problems, he does not use the phenomenological method, but the regressive and constructive procedure, which he himself elsewhere criticizes. Konsequent zu sein, ist die größte Obliegenheit eines Philosophen, und wird doch am seltensten angetroffen. (...) Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Die Vernunft ist immer beim Menschen die gehorsamste Dienerin des Herzens; was er wünscht, das stellt er sich als seiend vor und demonstriert er, wenn er einmal zu räsonieren anfängt, a priori aus der Vernunft als notwendig. Feuerbach, Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie. It were better […] never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. (shrink)

I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not (...) originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered as a form of radical empiricism in the sense of James, since it holds—like traditionalempiricism—that sensuous experience is the foundation and the source of justifi cation of knowledge, but—in contrast with traditional empiricism—it holds that there are relations, which are given in the sensuous experience just as well contents. Reality is sensuous and the structure of reality is equally sensuous. By an analysis of the concepts of the sensuous relation, (...) of the material a priori, and of association, it is showed that Husserl—in contrast with transcendentalism—confers a normative role to the peculiarity of sensuous contents, which determines their objective connections and also the structure of the world before the intellectual activities of the subject. At the same time, it is pointed out that Husserl has never entirely gotten over the Cartesian psychologism of Brentano and of traditional empiricism, that leads him to consider only the immanent as properly present. Finally, the paper discusses Husserl’s concept of the life-world, which originates from Avenarius’ idea of the natural concept of the world, and his position regarding the relation between experience and science. (shrink)

The sense of agency – the subjective feeling of being in control of our own actions – is one central aspect of the phenomenology of action. Computational models provided important contributions toward unveiling the mechanisms underlying the sense of agency in individual action. In particular, the sense of agency is believed to be related to the match between the actual and predicted consequences of our own actions (comparator model). In the study of joint action, models are even more necessary to (...) understand the mechanisms underlying the development of coordination strategies and how the subjective experiences of control emerge during the interaction. In a joint action, we not only need to predict the consequences of our own actions; we also need to predict the actions and intentions of our partner, and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. Understanding our partner and developing mutually satisfactory coordination strategies are key components of joint action and in the development of the sense of joint agency. Here we discuss a computational architecture which addresses the sense of agency during intentional, real-time joint action. We first reformulate previous accounts of the sense of agency in probabilistic terms, as the combination of prior beliefs about the action goals and constraints, and the likelihood of the predicted movement outcomes. To look at the sense of joint agency, we extend classical computational motor control concepts - optimal estimation and optimal control. Regarding estimation, we argue that in joint action the players not only need to predict the consequences of their own actions, but also need to predict partner’s actions and intentions (a ‘partner model’) and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. As regards action selection, we use differential game theory – in which actions develop in continuous space and time - to formulate the problem of establishing a stable form of coordination and as a natural extension of optimal control to joint action. The resulting model posits two concurrent observer-controller loops, accounting for ‘joint’ and ‘self’ action control. The two observers quantify the likelihoods of being in control alone or jointly. Combined with prior beliefs, they provide weighing signals which are used to modulate the ‘joint’ and ‘self’ motor commands. We argue that these signals can be interpreted as the subjective sense of joint and self agency. We demonstrate the model predictions by simulating a sensorimotor interactive task where two players are mechanically coupled and are instructed to perform planar movements to reach a shared final target by crossing two differently located intermediate targets. In particular, we explore the relation between self and joint agency and the information available to each player about their partner. The proposed model provides a coherent picture of the inter-relation of prediction, control, and the sense of agency in a broader range of joint actions. (shrink)

Research on elders’ acceptance of virtual technologies is much needed. Here we studied the user experience of elders (N = 10, mean age = 88.2 years) during virtual biking, an exergame where participants pedal on a cycle ergometer and wear a Head-Mounted Display that provides them an immersive experience of a bike ride. We tested the effects of augmented gaze on user experience. Augmented gaze is a condition in which horizontal head turns yield amplified visual shifts, which is assumed to (...) facilitate visual exploration. User experience was measured by asking participants to rate satisfaction, motivation, sense of presence and sense of safety. We found a very good acceptance of virtual biking and no signs of negative effects of augmented gaze. These preliminary observations suggest that augmented gaze may be a viable optimization of elders’ experience with certain virtual reality applications. (shrink)

In view of the incompatibility between scientific and manifest image one can either consider the scientific world as true and the sensuous world as merely subjective or consider the latter as true and the former as a subjective construction. Sellars holds the first position, namely scientific realism. By relying on Husserl, who holds the second position, I try to show that the first position has absurd consequences and is idealistic. For the measure of all things is not science, but perception.

In this article a comparison is made between the way the conditions of possibility of experience are conceived by Husserl and by Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. I show that — contrary to the latter — Husserl claims that the conditions of possibility of experience lie in the factually given sensuous contents, because sensuous syntheses, which are at the basis of the objectual constitution, depend just on the peculiarity and the course of sensuous contents. Because of a conception of the relation (...) between experience and thought that is antithetical to the idealistic one, Husserl holds that only experienceable forms can produce connections, which are not merely thought, but given in experience. What determines the structure of the world is therefore not the thinking or the understanding, but the sensuous given, which is independent from the subjective thought-activity and factual or contingent, since it cannot be traced back to a priori principles. The world-constitution is consequently an irrational fact, namely something that can be described, but not rationally explained. (shrink)

Mit dem vorliegenden Band wurde erstmalig eine Sammlung von Beiträgen in die Reihe Schriften zur Transzendentalphilosophie aufgenommen, deren thematischer Schwerpunkt nicht auf der systematischen Erörterung und Fortführung eines transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatzes liegt, sondern auf der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der idealistischen, insbesondere der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, die sich historisch als Antwort auf und Weiterführung der von Kant und Fichte erreichten Positionen verstand. Die Aufnahme des Bandes in diese Reihe trägt damit der Tatsache Rechnung, daß sich gerade auf dem Gebiet der Rechtsphilosophie die Differenz (...) zwischen transzendentalphilosophischer und spekulativer Begründung besonders deutlich und faßbar zeigt, und zwar so, daß die Notwendigkeit und Fruchtbarkeit des transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatzes noch einmal in einem anderen Licht erscheint. (shrink)

‘Als de geesteswetenschappen zichzelf als de dienstmaagd van archivarissen en museumdirecteuren beschouwen, kunnen ze er bezwaarlijk van opkijken dat de belangstelling voor hen afneemt. Een dode geest is een oxymoron, en de archivering van meningen uit het verleden is op zichzelf niet interessanter dan een opsomming van uitgestorven soorten.’.

Vittorio Hösle , , | : Cet article ambitionne de comprendre la crise écologique dans sa portée métaphysique. Pour ce faire, l’auteur analyse d’abord ce qu’il considère comme l’interprétation métaphysique la plus courante de cette crise, soit la métaphysique de l’esprit, qui trouve sa source dans une lecture simpliste de la pensée de G.W.F. Hegel. Ensuite, il examine les deux principales critiques adressées à cette métaphysique de l’esprit, soit d’une part l’interprétation heideggérienne de l’histoire de l’être et, d’autre part, (...) le panthéisme naturaliste d’inspiration écologiste dont le philosophe allemand Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich est le principal représentant. Enfin, en guise de synthèse, l’auteur élabore sa propre analyse en mettant en lumière le phénomène d’éloignement croissant de la subjectivité et de l’être à l’époque moderne comme la principale source métaphysique de la présente crise écologique. | : This article aims to understand the ecological crisis in its metaphysical significance. To do so, the author first analyzes what he sees as the most common metaphysical interpretation of the crisis, viz. the metaphysics of the mind, which is rooted in a simplistic reading of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. Next, he examines the two main criticisms of the metaphysics of mind, on the one hand, Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of Being and, on the other hand, the naturalistic ecologist pantheism best represented by the German philosopher Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich. Finally, by way of summary, the author develops his own analysis by highlighting the phenomenon of growing alienation of subjectivity and Being in modern times as the main metaphysical source of the current ecological crisis. (shrink)

Résumé Les ancêtres de la téléréalité, comme l’émission américaine Candid Camera, ont su très tôt mobiliser un charisme de la réalité qui magnétise aujourd’hui un nombre croissant de nos contemporains. Ces pratiques télévisuelles se sont développées en étroite interaction avec les expérimentations faites sur la psychologie sociale et l’hypnose, révélant une convergence entre sciences, technologies médiatiques et mécanismes de pouvoir que cet article s’efforce de faire apparaître dans ses dimensions à la fois historique et théorique.

de Bruin & Gallagher suggest that the view of embodied simulation put forward in our recent article lacks explanatory power. We argue that the notion of reuse of mental states represented with a bodily format provides a convincing simulational account of the mirroring mechanism and its role in mind -reading.

O autor estabelece uma comparação entre Althusser e Derrida a partir da questão da temporalidade, por meio da leitura que os dois autores propõem de Marx sub specie theatri. A partir disso emerge uma teoria da temporalidade em Althusser que está além tanto da teleologia da tradição hegeliano-marxista, quanto do messianismo sem messias proposto por Derrida em sua releitura benjaminiana de Marx. Nesse sentido, a escatologia em Althusser só é pensável à la cantonade.

Among the Althusserian writings of the 1980s, the authors focus their attention on the most significant one, “The Underground Current of Materialism of Encounter”, which deals mainly with the theme of encounter - rather than those of emptiness or nothingness, considered as secondary by the authors. In this perspective, it is paradoxically the work of Darwin which becomes a crucial reference, helping a Marxist theory of History to emancipate itself from any teleological paradigm.

La trattatistica della ragion di Stato ha contribuito a superare il modello ideale dello stato platonico, il modello naturalistico aristotelico, il modello del diritto naturale teologico della« respublica christiana ». Insieme al machiavellismo ha conquistato la moderna distinzione tra politica e morale, ha prodotto una realistica pedagogia dell’arte di governare. Costituisce un contributo essenziale all’elaborazione del mito dello Stato moderno, con i suoi caratteri di universalità realmente operante nel disciplinamento sociale e individuale, ma anche con i limiti e le contraddizioni (...) che neppure la forma del mito riesce a nascondere: crisi e guerra (civile e tra le nazioni). (shrink)

Estas páginas son un pequeño homenaje a Karl-Otto Apel. Desde el recuerdo de nuestros encuentros, pretendo hacer una aproximación a su persona, tanto desde el punto de vista intelectual, como -sobre todo- desde una perspectiva humana y personal. These pages are a small tribute to Karl-Otto Apel. From the memory of our encounters, I intend to make an approximation to his person, both from the intellectual point of view and -above all- from a human and personal perspective.

The essay explores Charles Taylor′s “A Secular Age” and focuses on following shortcomings of the work: Is the separation of the sacred and the profane a loss or an intensivation of religiosity? Does the Kantian universalist ethics not represent an increased commitment to basic Christian ideas? Must not even atheism be interpreted as a step in the self-unfolding of the divine? Taylor′s remarkable work is interpreted as being too strongly committed to Catholic personalism and not sufficiently familiar with the Protestant (...) theological tradition. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteur se propose de jeter un éclairage sur ce qu’il considère être les lois essentielles ayant contribué au développement de la culture humaine depuis ses débuts jusqu’à la crise écologique actuelle. Précisément, il s’agit de mener une analyse, sous la forme d’une analyse de l’histoire des fondements culturels et historiques , des différentes conceptions du rapport entre l’être humain et la nature et du concept de nature qui se sont succédé dans l’histoire et qui se trouvent aujourd’hui (...) au coeur des sciences modernes de la nature et de la technique. Ce faisant, l’auteur aspire à contribuer à l’élaboration d’une nouvelle philosophie de la nature qui soit en mesure de faire face à la présente crise écologique. (shrink)

The paper examines Althusser’s readings of Gramsci, from the first critical notes and annotations to his writings on the crisis of Marxism. It highlights the profound ambivalence of Althusser’s interpretations. On the one hand, Gramsci is presented as a precursor, as the only figure within the Marxist tradition deemed to have attempted to think the superstructure, and in particular the political. On the other side, the Gramscian corpus is criticized as the paradigmatic instance of a conception of temporality and politics (...) with which Althusser is in disagreement. Regarding the Althusserian critique, we here identify two distinct phases starting out from a critique of the lack of knowledge of the specific status of science in general, especially of the science of history, characteristic of the second half of the sixties, Althusser would, in the late seventies, formulate a critique of the Gramscian concept of hegemony which, in his view, erases the question of class domination. (shrink)